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In June 2007, the people of Koroba-Lake Kopiago went to the polls for the fourth time in five years. The election was of particular interest because Koroba-Lake Kopiago was one of the six open electorates in which the 2002 general election had been deemed to have failed, and was one of the 10 electorates around the country that had had a limited preferential voting (LPV) by-election prior to the general election. It is also an electorate that has been subject to election studies in the past (see Haley 2002 and Robinson 2002 and for which there is consequently a great deal of comparative longitudinal data. This chapter draws upon observations and findings of both the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election observation team ) and the 2007 Koroba-Lake Kopiago domestic observation team. 1 It finds that the election was anything but fair, yet despite fraud and malpractice on a scale never before seen the election was widely held to have been successful and a significant improvement on 2002. It further suggests that the national government and Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) were willing to accept results at any cost in order to avoid a repetition of the events of 2002 (Somare 2006:5) , and advocates a more honest assessment of future elections. The integrity of elections cannot merely be asserted but must be demonstrated.
Background
Koroba-Lake Kopiago is one of eight open electorates in Southern Highlands Province (Figure 20.1) . It is a large ethnically divided electorate situated in the far north-western corner of the province, sharing boundaries with Enga, Sandaun, East Sepik and Western provinces (Figure 21 .1). The district comprises four local-level governments (LLGs) for census purposes-North Koroba LLG (26 wards), South Koroba LLG (23 wards), Lake Kopiago LLG (19 wards) and Auwi-Pori LLG (27 wards)-and three and a half LLGs for electoral purposes. Like several other LLGs in Southern Highlands Province, Auwi-Pori LLG is split between two open electorates, namely Koroba-Lake Kopiago and Tari-Pori Open.
2 This has proved to be an ongoing source of confusion to voters and electoral officials alike. Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate extends northwest from Koroba and Mogorofugwa-two densely populated wetland basins inhabited by Huli speakers-towards the Strickland-Lagaip river junction, thereby taking in the country of the Duna, Hewa, Bogaia and Awi peoples. Much of the electorate (especially the northwest) is accessible only by air, or several days walking with hazardous river crossings. Political leaders (including many of the ward councillors) spend little, if any, time in the district and vast majority of public servants are also absent. As a consequence there is little by the way of government service delivery and armed conflict is commonplace, as are illegal weapons (see Haley and Muggah 2006) .
A history of violence
Since 1997, when guns were first used to menace voters in Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate (Robinson 2002) , violence and intimidation have figured prominently in elections in this part of the Southern Highlands (see also Haley 2002 Haley , 2004 . In 1997 for instance, guns were used to influence electoral outcomes by controlling the voting at particular polling stations and a helicopter carrying the then sitting member, Herowa Agiwa, was fired upon by supporters of an opposing candidate during the campaign period. The latter incident resulted in over US$300,000 damage to the Hevilift helicopter (Haley 2004:19) .
By 2002 guns and violence were widespread: election-related deaths were reported during the campaign period and in the aftermath of the elections; Ben Peri (a high profile Duna candidate) was kidnapped and held for ransom; another candidate armed his own militia; all air traffic was suspended following threats that planes would be shot out of the sky; and voters throughout the electorate were threatened and intimidated by candidates and their supporters (Haley 2004) . These factors contributed to the failure of the 2002 elections.
Post 2002, elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago have involved huge investments in security. Two thousand additional security personnel were deployed under a national call-out during the 2003 supplementary elections, 800 additional police and Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) personnel were engaged during the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election security operations , and an additional 2500 security personnel were deployed to the Southern Highlands in 2007. Despite the huge security presence and the imposition of a state of emergency followed by special police operations in the 10 months leading up to the elections, guns remained present in the electorate in significant numbers.
Indeed, members of the Koroba-Lake Kopiago observer team reported seeing both high-powered and homemade weapons throughout the electorate and a relative abundance of black market ammunition at pre-state-of-emergency prices (see chapter 8 and Haley and Muggah 2006) . They also reported road closures, intermittent election-related violence; and an election-related death in the leadup to polling at Koroba. One observer was threatened and warned away from a polling station at Harereke by men armed with bush knives, and the brother of another observer was killed at Koroba. That said, there were few overt displays of weapons at polling places, and guns were not openly used to intimidate and influence the vote as they had been in 1997 and 2002.
A history of fraud and malpractice
I have documented in considerable detail the fraudulent electoral practices that have characterized elections in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate over the past decade (Haley 2002 (Haley , 2004 . The 2007 election, like those of the past decade, lacked integrity and was marred by widespread cheating, fraud and malpractice. Key strategies effectively utilized in the past were once again employed. These included inflating the electoral roll, having electoral officials removed and replaced, diverting and impounding ballot boxes, using excess ballot papers, pre-marking ballot papers, and voting multiple times. Much of the malpractice witnessed in 2007, which is detailed in the following sections of this chapter, can be attributed to the poor state of the new electoral roll.
Key electoral personnel
One of the ways candidates sought to control election outcomes in 2007 was through control of key election officials. This proved to be a particularly ineffective strategy as in-fighting between key election officials detrimentally impacted upon their performance and saw them effectively paralysed at key junctures. As a consequence, the security personnel stepped in, assuming responsibility for critical aspects of the election preparations (see chapter 8).
Without exception, observers were critical of the key electoral personnel engaged to conduct the elections in Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate. They were particularly critical of the Southern Highlands election manager, David Wakias, considering him to be both ineffectual and partisan. They observed that he could rarely be found in his office, 'spent most of his time roaming around in his hire car' and seemed 'happy to let the politically appointed provincial returning officer-Charles Ipa-run the show'. Another observer had this to say: 'He is a good man, good at making excuses and delaying things. For example he didn't allow people to check their names on the electoral roll to see whether they were enrolled or not'.
Observers were equally critical of the returning officer and assistant returning officers. They too were considered partisan, politically compromised, and unfit to undertake their appointed rolls. The returning officer, Denny Hongai, and the assistant returning officers for North Koroba (Haddick Apiako/Sakopa), South Koroba (Don Piru/Palabu) and Awi/Lokayu (Jackson Kenamu) had all held their positions since 2006, and in particular had run the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election. On this basis, one might have assumed a degree of confidence and the knowledge, skills and competency to run an election. Unfortunately this proved not to be the case.
There were problems too at Lake Kopiago. In the lead-up to the election the assistant returning officer's position changed hands several times. Steven Pauwini, the former council executive officer, had held the position during 2006. Following poor performance during the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago byelection he was replaced. Richard Bei/Pelaku took over the position of assistant returning officer for Lake Kopiago in early 2007-and was observed to be far more competent than his predecessor. On 23 March 2007, however, Bei's appointment was revoked and Jackson Hewape was appointed in his place (National Gazette No. G63, 19 April 2007 ). Hewape's appointment was subsequently revoked, and on 14 May 2007, Bei was reappointed to the position. There were rumours that Hewape was again reappointed to the position in mid-June, but no evidence of this could be found in the National Gazette. In any event both men continued to argue that they were the duly appointed assistant returning officer, both accompanied the ballot boxes and ballot papers to Lake Kopiago, both sought to direct polling operations at Lake Kopiago on polling day, and both were present in the counting room. It is understood that in the week before polling the election manager instructed both men to work together, and that he appointed Jackson Hewape as assistant to the Lake Kopiago assistant returning officer. Needless to say this caused much confusion in the electorate and hampered planning and performance. It also caused considerable consternation in the counting room, resulting in much discussion about the integrity of the 19 Lake Kopiago ballot boxes, and saw scrutineers for the various Huli candidates seek to have the boxes excluded from the count.
Electoral rolls (past and present)
In the wake of the 2002 election, new electoral rolls were created for each of Papua New Guinea's 109 electorates. On the face of it the new Koroba-Lake Kopiago electoral roll, which resulted from a re-registration exercise undertaken in late 2005, appears more accurate than those used in 1997, 2002, and 2003 . The new roll, for instance, has only 48,739 names as compared with the 2002 roll which listed 60,300 enrolled voters. Appearances can be deceptive though. In the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case the electoral roll is grossly inaccurate, with many more enrolled voters than eligible citizens (Table 21 .1). a The expected enrolment is held to be 50 percent of the total projected electorate population, calculated from the 1990 census figures using the national population growth rate of 2.7 percent per annum.
As outlined in Table 21 .1, enrolled voters have far exceeded the number of eligible citizens in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate for more than a decade now (see Haley 2002 Haley , 2004 , with the original inflation of the roll dating back to the 1997 elections. In 1992 14,264 votes were counted. In 1997 there was a twofold increase in the number of ballots cast, with 32,724 votes allowed (Haley 2002:134) . Since then, over 40,000 votes have been cast at each election.
Based on population figures projected from the 1990 census, and confirmed in many wards by a household census conducted in 1997 (Haley and Robinson 1998; Robinson and Haley 1998a, 1998b) it is estimated that there should have been no more than 27,500 eligible voters in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate in 2007. The common roll created for the 2007 election, however, contained 48,739 names, and is replete with gross irregularities, including highly inflated voter numbers in at least one-quarter of proclaimed wards; thousands of eligible citizens disenfranchised and not on the roll or allocated to the wrong wards; thousands of under-age voters, enrolled by virtue of fictitious birth dates; and thousands of duplicate entries.
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In order to get a fuller sense of the problems associated with the new electoral roll, the Koroba-Lake Kopiago observer team undertook a careful analysis of ward rolls within the Lake Kopiago LLG area. 5 This was done using census material collected in the past (Haley and Robinson 1998; Robinson and Haley 1998a, 1998b) , on the basis of our own knowledge, and in consultation with community leaders. This close examination of the ward rolls for the 19 wards within Lake Kopiago LLG-one of four LLGs within Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate-revealed that only half (50.2 percent) of the 10,351 enrolled voters were actually eligible to enrol. Examination of the ward rolls for Lake Kopiago also revealed the following irregularities:
• highly inflated voter numbers in many wards • entire villages and hamlets assigned to the wrong wards • 2426 (23.4 percent) enrolled voters who were not known in the ward • 1197 (11.6 percent) under-age voters enrolled with fictitious birth dates • 744 (7.2 percent) enrolled voters who did not meet residency requirement • 664 (6.4 percent) duplicate entries • 243 (2.3 percent) deceased voters who miraculously re-registered • at least 735 eligible citizens who do not appear on the new electoral roll.
Put simply, there are gross irregularities with the electoral roll across the entire electorate. As well as wards in which enrolments are highly inflated, there are wards which are under-enrolled, and over-enrolled wards which are missing significant numbers of eligible citizens. In some cases this seems to have been due to administrative errors but in other cases because enterprising candidates successfully managed to ensure that their opponents' supporters were disenfranchised. In Koroba-Lake Kopiago, and indeed elsewhere in the Southern Highlands, observers identified whole families and clans which were disenfranchised by being placed in the wrong wards or by being left off the roll completely. These irregularities meant that while some people were not included on the roll at all, others were included from two to six times.
Based on the above analysis the Lake Kopiago LLG roll should have included some 6000 names: the 5196 correctly enrolled people (50.2 percent of 10,351) plus the 735+ eligible citizens who were missing altogether. If one takes the 1990 census population for Lake Kopiago LLG, which is predominantly Duna speaking, and projects forward to 2007 using the national population growth rate, an eligible voting population of 6200 should have been expected. On this basis the LLG was over-enrolled by 67 percent at the time of the 2007 election. Using the same methodology, the North Koroba and South Koroba LLGs, which are ethnically Huli, were over-enrolled by 79 percent and 84 percent respectively, 6 while Auwi-Pori LLG, where voters are Duna speaking, was over-enrolled by 71 percent. Overall, the Duna-speaking parts of the electorate are over-enrolled by 68 percent while the Huli-speaking parts of the electorate were over-enrolled by 82 percent. This amplifies the electoral advantage the Huli command, and delivers to them nearly 15,000 additional ballot papers/votes, as compared to the 6400 additional ballot papers/votes available to the Duna.
Both the enrolment and verification exercises were highly problematic in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate. Very few people actually saw the enrolment teams and even fewer filled out a claim for enrolment form. Correct procedure dictates that eligible citizens should have completed and signed a claim for enrolment form, in order to re-enrol. Observers across the electorate reported that teams of local men were employed to complete, sign and witness the forms on behalf of the wider community. In doing so these enumerators knowingly witnessed and signed off on thousands of forms in which false claims or declarations had been made. In the vast majority of cases there was no excuse for witnessing false declarations as the local men employed as village enumerators were from the wards in which they undertook the enrolment exercise and would have known who was under-age, who was long absent from the electorate (that is, those who did not meet the legislatively proscribed residency requirements), 7 and which of the would-be electors were actually dead.
Across the electorate claims of political interference in the enrolment process, and claims that not enough forms were sent out were regularly encountered. There is seemingly some merit in these allegations in that there is huge overenrolment in some wards and significant under-enrolment in others. Haredege ward, one of the most-populous wards in Lake Kopiago LLG is a case in point. Based on the 1990 census, a voting population of 463 was expected in 2007; however, the 2007 ward roll contained only 158 names, thus two-thirds of eligible voters in the ward were disenfranchised.
Observations made during the 2007 domestic observation reveal that the wider community was not complicit in the fraud that saw them placed on the roll multiple times. Indeed the vast majority of people did not personally place themselves on the roll, and prior to the civic and electoral awareness undertaken by Ima Kelo between November 2006 and April 2007 (see chapter 20) many were not even aware that new rolls had been created. Of the 12 domestic observers who live in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate and were eligible to enrol, only one had completed a claim for enrolment form, yet they were all enrolledand most were enrolled multiple times. At least three of the domestic observers appeared on the roll three separate times. A survey of 200 voters, undertaken during the campaign period, further revealed that only 12 people (seven men and five women), 6 percent of the survey respondents, had actually completed a 'claim for enrolment' form.
Like the enrolment exercise, the verification exercise was highly problematic. The rolls were not publicly displayed in the wards or in Kopiago sub-district. Our Koroba observers reported that the rolls were on display at Koroba district office but they disagree over how long for-reports ranging from one to seven days. In Mendi, the provincial headquarters, the rolls went on public display only 48 hours before the issue of writs-so that there was only a very small window of opportunity for voters to check whether their name appeared on the roll. For those who managed to check the roll, the exercise proved futile, because amendments made during the 48-hour window were not reflected on the final rolls. One of the observers, Kenny Kendoli, travelled to Mendi and sought to have his multiple entries removed. He annotated the verification roll in the presence of the election manager, and the observation coordinator, yet he still appeared on the electoral roll in three places. At the same time, he sought to have his four under-age children removed from the roll, by annotating their entries to the effect that they were under-age. All four children remained on the roll. They were included on the roll without their parents' knowledge or consent, and all appear with fictitious birthdates (Table 21 .2). Two other observers collectively made several hundred corrections to various Lake Kopiago rolls on display in Mendi, in order to move disenfranchised voters to their correct wards. Similarly, these amendments were not reflected on the final rolls.
Despite the fact that the rolls were not publicly displayed as they should have been, the assistant returning officers, with assistance from local enumerators, undertook a roll-cleansing exercise of sorts. In the Kopiago and Awi/Logayu LLG areas this saw enrolments decrease substantially, and in South Koroba it saw enrolments increase (Table 21. 3). The assistant returning officers for Kopiago and Awi/Logayu alleged a conspiracy on the part of the returning officer, claiming that while the North and South Koroba assistant returning officers were given plenty of forms, they got only a handful and so were not able to enrol missing voters during the verification exercise. Table 21 .4 compares actual enrolments with expected enrolments, at the ward level, based on the 1990 census. 8 It shows significant over-enrolment in a large number of Huli-speaking wards, and makes evident that enrolments in several already over-enrolled wards increased even further during the verification process, which took place between the 2006 by-election and the 2007 general election. Enrolments in Tumbite ward, for example, increased from 1299 in 2006 to 2586 in 2007, while enrolments in Pubulumu 1 and 2 increased from 796 to 2485. At Tumbite inflation of the roll was achieved by duplication using different but similar spellings of the same name and by giving different birth years for each entry (see Table 21 .13 in the appendix of this chapter for examples). Among the Huli, 'K' and 'G', 'P' and 'B' and 'Y' and 'J' are often used interchangeably. These regular variations form the basis of the duplication identified. a The expected ward enrolment in this case was held to be 50 percent of the total projected population and was calculated from the 1990 census figures using the national population growth rate of 2.7 percent per annum.
b This represents four more papers than were collectively issued to these two polling stations, although in fact nine additional ballot papers found their way into the Pumbulumu 1 ballot box. In each of these paired wards enrolments are significantly inflated, with many individuals appearing on both ward rolls. In 2006 and 2007 the polling places for these paired wards were set up side by side and voters were repeatedly observed to move between polling stations, and to vote at both, often multiple times.
The 2007 candidates and their alliances
Seventeen candidates contested the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open seat in 2007. This was a smaller field than in 2002, when 19 candidates contested, and a smaller field than the 2006 by-election, which had been contested by a record 20 candidates. Of the 17 candidates, 11 had contested this seat previously, and nine had contested the 2006 by-election, which had been conducted under LPV. No women contested the seat. For the first time ever, there were more Duna candidates than Huli candidates (Table 21 .6), and as in 1997 and 2002 cultural identity and ethnicity figured importantly in campaigning. MP 1982 MP -1992 . 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2002 All six candidates scored over 4500 first preference votes and were the last six candidates left in the race. The same six had filled the top six positions in the 2006 by-election, and Thomas, Peri, Olape and Agiwa had filled the top four positions in the 2003 supplementary elections. All six candidates benefited, to some extent, from the over-enrolments detailed in the last section (see Table 21 .5), although some more than others.
Agreements and alliances were formed between several candidates, with some, namely Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye, and Paiele Elo and Ronald Kulakua, agreeing to share preferences, and others, particularly the weaker candidates, apparently standing to split the votes of stronger candidates. The reputed alliances and shared histories of the candidates are summarised in Table 21 .8. At least four minor 'vote-splitting' candidates were reported to be receiving financial support from the more serious candidates. 10 Specifically, it was widely asserted that Agiru Hole was funded by Ben Peri to split John Kekeno's base vote, and that Paiele Elo, Ronald Kulakua and McEnene Mai Paiale Elo were all sponsored by and/or receiving support from John Kekeno to split Ben Peri's and Petrus Thomas's votes. Thomas Tupia was also considered a vote-splitter and was widely held to be working with Matthew Magaye to split the Kopiago vote, which was expected to go to Peri and Thomas. It was not clear whether Tupia was receiving financial support from Magaye.
In the lead-up to the election Matthew Magaye, who had contested the seat on four previous occasions, being runner-up in 1992 and 1997, was acknowledged to have strong support in Auwi-Logaiyu. He was the sole candidate from that LLG area. However, the 2006 by-election had shown that he lacked the ability to draw preferences from elsewhere in the electorate, and that his support was on the wane. Indeed in 1997, Magaye had gained 6582 votes, yet in the 2006 by-election he had picked up only 4449 first preference votes. Magaye sought to address his diminishing popularity by having Tupia stand to split the Kopiago vote and by seeking to capture preferences which might otherwise have flowed to the Kopiago candidates. He sought to achieve the latter by entering into a memorandum of understanding with Ben Peri to exchange preferences.
Both strategies failed as only 18 of Tupia's 810 votes flowed to Magaye upon elimination (most flowed to Peri and Thomas) and Magaye himself was eliminated before Peri.
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Not all the weaker candidates were merely vote splitters-some were standing to increase their profile in the electorate. Paul Pora Wasdok, for instance, was reputed to be standing so people 'would know him in 2012' while Kulakua was contesting to improve his standing for the LLG elections. In his case this proved an effective strategy, as he was elected Lake Kopiago LLG president in 2008. Phillip Pakalu's reason for contesting was the most unusual. Evidently he was contesting because his wife, Lucy Pakalu, had contested the seat during the 2006 by-election, gaining 66 first preference votes, finishing 16th in a field of 20 candidates. Apparently she had challenged him to contest to demonstrate whether he could pull more votes than she had. Phillip who had previously contested the 1992 elections, gaining only a handful of votes, pulled only 47 first preference votes and finished 15 in a field of 17.
Campaigning in 2007
As expected, campaigning in the 2007 general election was generally accommodative, with candidates being able to campaign more widely and move around more freely than they had in either the 2002 national elections or the 2003 supplementary elections-something that had also been observed in previous LPV by-elections (Standish 2006:8; Haley 2006:24) . That said, candidates did not move around as freely as they had in the 2006 by-election, and few campaigned across ethnic boundaries. Indeed, 2007 saw the return of ethnically closed campaigning (cf. Haley 2002; 2007) , with Huli candidates campaigning in North Koroba and South Koroba-the Huli-speaking parts of the electorate-and Duna candidates campaigning at Kopiago and in AuwiLogaiyy-the predominantly Duna-speaking parts of the electorate. Petrus Thomas proved to be the only real exception to this in that he spent several weeks at a time in the electorate, campaigning in both Duna-and Huli-speaking areas (Figure 21.2) . None of the Huli candidates campaigned at Kopiago this time around, although several, including Matthias Olape and Isaac Matiabe, had during the 2006 by-election. Compared with previous elections, including the 2006 by-election, campaigning was a much more low-key affair. Few of the candidates spent much time campaigning in the electorate, relying instead on campaign managers and diehard supporters to campaign on their behalf. Active campaigning by candidates was confined to the later stages of the campaign period. Generally, candidates were observed to concentrate their campaign efforts on areas where they believed they had base support, and on attending rallies and opening ceremonies in areas where preferences were deemed to be on offer (see chapter 20).
While it was evident from the way many of the not-so-strong candidates campaigned that they did not fully appreciate the importance of preferences, the top six candidates clearly did. All campaigned strategically, seeking first preferences in their home areas and minor preferences elsewhere, whereas the not so serious candidates campaigned mostly for minor preferences. Overall there was little concerted collaboration between candidates and no serious evidence of widespread preference swapping between parties or individual candidates, although compared with 2006 there was certainly more cooperation between candidates, which suggests a growing awareness about the way LPV works. For example, Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye entered into a memorandum of understanding to exchange preferences, while Paiele Elo and Ronald Kulaka were observed to encourage their supporters to preference each other. Importantly, these latter agreements also reflected the widespread view that preferences should be retained within the same cultural, linguistic or ethnic group.
It was also suggested that this was the reason John Kekeno provided support to three Duna candidates, in that he recognised that 'Duna' votes were unlikely to flow to him in the form of preferences but was keen to see them exhausted so as to prevent them from flowing to the two strong Duna candidates-Peri and Thomas. If this was indeed his strategy, it did not prove particularly effective, as candidates have little control over the way their supporters allocate preferences. For instance, when Paiele Elo Ronald Kulakua and McEnene Mai Elo were eliminated, half of their votes were distributed to other Duna candidates, particularly Thomas and Peri.
As in previous elections, candidates offered incentives of one kind or anothercash and promises of projects and future support-in order to secure votes. Several of the candidates gave out road maintenance and grass cutting contracts, while some funded or made arrangements for people living outside the electorate to travel home in order to cast their votes. Indeed in the days prior to polling there were constant streams of public motor vehicles, reputedly hired by Ben Peri, Petrus Thomas, John Kekeno and Herowa Agiwa, ferrying voters into the electorate. The stronger candidates also put considerable effort into inflating electoral rolls in areas where they enjoyed base support, and into influencing key electoral officials. Much effort was also put into attempts to have key electoral officials removed and replaced at the eleventh hour-a strategy successfully employed in past elections (see Haley 2004:20) .
Influence of political parties
As has been noted by observers of previous Papua New Guinea elections, including the LPV by-elections conducted under the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections 2002, party endorsement, where it occurs, often means very little on the ground (Standish 2006:10; see also Haley 2004:18) . Gibbs (2006:13) , for example, notes that in the 2004 Wabag by-election, only two candidates had party endorsement and that party affiliation 'was not a very significant factor in voting patterns'. Standish et al. (2004:6) also note that party policies are seldom discussed and that party politics is 'largely decorative', being confined to 'impressive nomination rallies' and the occasional fleeting visit by party leaders or prominent ministers. Such statements ring true in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago context. As in earlier elections there was no evidence to suggest that party affiliation signalled an endorsement of particular political views or positions. Indeed all Koroba-Lake Kopiago candidates, party endorsed and independent alike, campaigned on similar platforms, asserting that they would be a good leader and would bring goods and services. Collectively they promised to support church, youth and women's groups; to bring development; to ensure roads and airstrips were maintained; and to ensure that schools and health services were properly staffed and funded. Seemingly, party affiliation had little influence on voters. This is not to suggest that parties are completely irrelevant. To the contrary, strong candidates sought and were able to gain party endorsement, and those with party endorsement generally polled quite well. This is because parties seek to endorse likely winners, or those with a real chance of success. In the Koroba-Lake Kopiago context, party endorsement is viewed as part of the candidate's broader deportment, which itself is seen to reflect their inner worth and likelihood of success at the polls (see Haley 2008 Haley , 2004 . For this reason, Phillip Pakalu's failure to gain party endorsement from Star Alliance gave rise to much discussion in the electorate and was seen to signal that his campaign was doomed to fail.
In the final analysis, six of the ten party-endorsed candidates were the toppolling candidates at the end of the first preference count and the final six candidates in the race. This, I suggest, had more to do with the overall popularity of those candidates than their party affiliations as such. Where candidates had party endorsement, this typically translated into some level of support with campaign expenses-such as candidate posters and voter cards, and in some cases vehicle hire.
Influence of guns
Guns did not feature in this election to anywhere near the extent they had in 1997 and 2002. They were, however, still out there. In fact, members of the observer team saw firearms during nominations, the campaign period, in the lead-up to the poll, and even on polling day, but these and other weapons such as bush knives tended not to be openly displayed at polling places (except at Kopiago-see below), or used to influence the vote, as they had been in the past. It should be noted, though, that weapons were close to hand at several polling places, having been hidden in the nearby bush should they be needed.
At Koroba, where there was a strong security presence-notably armed PNGDF personnel (see chapter 8)-no weapons were seen at polling places, although several observers reported seeing candidates and supporters brandishing homemade weapons during the campaign period. Several high-powered weapons including AR15s, M16s and an Ultimax 100 were also seen (see chapter 8). At Kopiago, however, where the security forces were unarmed, several observers reported the presence of guns, bush knives and axes at polling places. Not surprisingly these observers felt that the security situation was similar to that of the failed 2002 elections. The majority, however, felt that the security situation was significantly better, attributing this to the PNGDF presence.
Influence of 'money politics'
While guns played less of a role in this election, 'money politics' was more significant than ever. Several candidates spent huge amounts of money offering material incentives to voters, and two were rumoured to have spent as much as K2 million on their respective campaigns. Voters in Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate capitalized on the huge amount of money available by courting multiple candidates and promising support in return for modest cash payments of up to K100. They also erected grandstands and conducted opening ceremonies as a means of generating money (see chapter 20). These rallies/opening ceremonies were organized by clans, church congregations, youth and women's groups and school committees as a means of generating funds. Candidates were invited to speak at these events and were expected to pay for the privilege. Observers reported that hire rates ranged between K100 and several thousand kina per speaking engagement. One rally at Guala, a week prior to the polls, netted K24,500 for the local Christian Brethren Church (CBC) community. Of this the sitting MP, John Kekeno, 'donated' K7000 to the CBC community school, K9000 to the CBC headquarters, K3000 to the CBC youth and K2000 to the CBC women's group. Seven candidates attended and spoke at this rally. A separate rally had been organized by the Guala youth a fortnight prior to this rally. It was attended by four candidates.
Observers also witnessed candidates and their supporters actually bribing or attempting to bribe voters with cash on polling day, and two observers witnessed vote-buying-related fights at polling stations. At Kakarene 1, a fight was observed to have erupted after a voter accepted payment from two separate candidates, while at Gunu 1 a fight erupted after a young man accepted money from a campaign manager then gave his first vote to a different candidate. At the same polling station a campaign manager seeking to gain votes for the sitting MP was seen to be promising blankets, stereos and spades in return for a first preference vote.
Somewhat ironically, several candidates also complained to the observer team about the inflationary aspect of elections, saying that the large amounts of cash being splashed around would inflate people's expectations in coming elections. Indeed it is evident that candidates are now having to rely on larger and larger networks in order to finance their campaigns, and that wealthy individuals (businessmen and community leaders) are financing and/or contributing towards candidates' campaigns in order to create indebtedness and to ensure that the candidate is beholden to them should they win.
Polling
Since 1997 voter turnout in Koroba-Lake Kopiago has always been high, with votes cast being significantly higher than the number of eligible citizens (see Table 21 .1), something facilitated by the poor state of the electoral roll. In this respect the 2007 election was no different from earlier elections. As noted earlier in this chapter, the 2007 Koroba-Lake Kopiago electoral roll, which was heavily inflated, contained 48,739 names. At the close of polling some 45,020 votes had been cast, and of these 44,473 were determined to be allowable ballots. This represents around 17,000 more votes than there are eligible citizens in the electorate.
Polling in the 2007 elections was far more peaceful than in recent elections, due in no small part to the huge security presence (see chapter 8). It remained generally chaotic, however, and was marred by widespread irregularities. Under-age voting (very small children, even babies, were seen voting or having votes cast on their behalf), multiple voting, 'line-up' voting, serial voting (that is, voting at different polling stations), 'outside' voting (voters from neighbouring electorates) and proxy voting were all commonplace. Almost without exception, voting took place publicly and there was no secret ballot. The indelible ink was not used or was used randomly, and excess ballot papers were used in many cases. Assisted voting, much of it seemingly forced, was commonplace (Figure 21. 3) and at several polling stations polling officials were observed to be issuing pre-marked ballot papers. In most cases, the electoral roll was not used properly, if at all, and at some polling stations (such as Tumbite, Pumbulumu 1 and Pumbulumu 2) groups of young men were issued with entire books of ballot papers, which were completed en masse. More than half (50/82) 12 of all polling stations were set up within easy walking distance of another (less than 500 metres apart) and many were set up literally side by side. At Lake Kopiago, for instance, the Kopiago Station and Ayukuni (Alukuni) polling stations were about 500 metres from each other and people were 12 In addition to the 36 wards which have paired names (such as Teria 1 and 2, Andiria 1 and 2, Hedemari 1 and 2 etc.) there were an additional 14 wards which were paired on polling day, namely Mbuli and Maria, Kopiago Station and Aiyuguni, Ayenda and Kagoma, Hauwinda and Kudiebi, Kenamu and Walukumu, Pandu and Koroba Station, and Tumbite and Tangimapu. observed walking back and forth voting at each of them, sometimes many times. More extreme examples included four polling stations (Tumbite, Pubulumu 1, Pubulumu 2 and Tangimapu) being set up side by side on Tumbite airstrip at Pureni, and seven polling stations being set up on Koroba Government Station (Teria 1, Teria 2, Pandu, Andiria 1, Andiria 2, Koroba Station and Kereneiba Part 2). These seven polling stations were set up within metres of each other, and voters were observed moving backwards and forwards between them (Figure 21 .4). Voters were similarly observed to move between Maria and Mbuli polling stations. There a relatively small number of people (approximately 300 voters) managed to cast 2204 votes, of which 2082 went to a single candidate, Isaac Matiabe, while at Tumbite an amazing 5941 votes were cast with 5813 of them going to Father Mathias Olape. Despite the many irregularities, there is also considerable evidence that people at the majority of polling places actually got to vote. Indeed men, women and children alike were observed to be lined up, in a reasonably orderly fashion, waiting for the opportunity to vote, and few reported being denied a vote. In fact many who wanted to were afforded the opportunity to vote several times. At Wurukumu, for instance, voters lined up, gave their names and then proceeded to the voting compartment where whole books of ballot papers were located.
There they were permitted to fill out as many ballot papers as they liked, until the papers ran out. At this particular polling place all 562 votes went to the sitting MP, John Kekeno.
In a post-polling survey of 200 voters (100 men and 100 women) at different locations throughout the electorate, 46 men and 12 women admitted to having voted more than once. Observations made on polling day suggest that the proportion of voters voting more than once was significantly higher. As part of the same post-polling survey 32 men and 34 women (one-third of all respondents) reported having experienced intimidation while voting, while 20 men and 29 women (one-quarter of all respondents) felt that the 2007 election was worse than the failed elections of 2002.
In spite of the intimidation experienced by a significant number of voters, the spread of votes at individual polling places suggests that a good number of voters were permitted to exercise choice when voting. At 25 of the 80 polling places (31 percent) the candidate that secured the most votes gained less than 50 percent of the votes cast, and at a further nine polling places (11 percent) the top-polling candidate gained between 51 and 60 percent of the vote. At these polling places votes were typically shared between several candidates, suggesting voters were afforded genuine choice when casting their votes. That said, there were also 15 polling places (19 percent) at which the top-polling candidate gained more than 96 percent of the votes cast, and a further eight polling places (10 percent) where the top-polling candidate gained 91-95 percent of the votes cast. In some cases (for instance Hirane, Aiyukuni, Kakoma and Walukumu) this can be explained in terms of a base vote and we can assume a fair degree of community consensus (although I doubt total consensus), but in others (such as Tumbite, Pumbulumu 1, Pumbulumu 2 and Tobi) it represents a forced, coerced or controlled vote. At places such as Tumbite and Pumbulumu where the vote was forced, individuals were denied the opportunity to mark their own papers. Not surprisingly the places where block votes and controlled votes were registered were all heavily over-enrolled and in fact tended to coincide with the wards that were most over-enrolled (see Tables 21.4 and 21.5). Table 21 .9 shows a three-fold increase in the number of boxes in which the top-polling candidate gained more that 90 percent of the votes cast and an almost four-fold increase in boxes where the leading candidate gained between 96 and 100 percent of the votes cast. That voters were afforded real choice at many polling stations can be demonstrated by comparing the way votes were allocated at Koroba Station (Table 21 .10) and within Kopiago Basin (Table 21 .11). Table 21 .10 shows that the votes cast at the seven Koroba Station polling places were shared between six main candidates. The results
The official election results are shown in Table 21 .16 in the appendix to this chapter. They reveal that the incumbent, John Kekeno, was returned, having gained 18 percent of first preference votes and 37 percent of the allowable ballot. By comparison, he had gained only 12 percent of first preference votes and 30 percent of the allowable ballot in the 2006 Koroba-Lake Kopiago by-election (see Table 21 .14 in the appendix to this chapter This is particularly noteworthy as it had been expected that with the introduction of LPV, the 2007 election would be more peaceful and see the election of MPs with wider and more representative mandates (Standish 2006:197; Reilly 2006:189; PNGEC 1997:13) . It was also suggested that LPV would reduce the number of candidates contesting elections and improve the chances of women being elected. The later proved unfounded in that men in Koroba-Lake Kopiago continued to assert their rights over those of women, insisting that women remain their property and should therefore vote in accordance with their husband's wishes.
Generally speaking, LPV has delivered larger mandates (see Anere and Wheen 2009:22-26 Under LPV the average overall mandate typically doubled, with winning candidates receiving 35-36 percent of the total allowable ballot after the distribution of preferences (see Haley and Anere 2009:60; Anere and Wheen 2009) . 13 In this respect, the Koroba-Lake Kopiago results are consistent with those elsewhere around the country. However, the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case also demonstrates that the total number of candidates and where they are from plays a key role in determining the winning candidate's overall mandate, as evident from the 2003 results.
It is arguably still too early to judge whether LPV will deliver larger mandates and more broadly supported candidates in the longer term, for this will largely depend upon two things: first, whether LPV attracts fewer candidates or gives rise to a proliferation of candidates, and, secondly, whether voters choose to make their votes count.
The early indications from Koroba-Lake Kopiago are mixed. For instance, the 2006 by-election, conducted under LPV, attracted the largest field ever, and the 2007 general election saw a record number of Duna candidates contest the seat. It also saw a return to ethnically closed campaigning, and this contributed in part to the proliferation of Duna candidates, in that John Kekeno (who is ethnically Huli) sponsored and gave support to three Duna candidates in order to split the vote of the two very strong Duna candidates and in an attempt to exhaust a significant proportion of Duna votes. Given that this strategy proved somewhat successful, it may well be adopted by other candidates in future elections, thereby contributing to candidate proliferation.
What the Koroba-Lake Kopiago results do reveal is that a significant proportion of voters chose to make their votes count, by using their preferences far more strategically and effectively than they had in the 2006 by-election. In 2007, 68 percent of the formal votes remained live at the completion of the final count, while 85 percent were still live immediately prior to the final exclusion. This shows that voters allocated their preferences to strong candidates with a likelihood of success, rather than to minor local candidates. By contrast, the 2006 by-election had seen 44 percent of votes exhausted. On average, in 2007, across all 105 electorates for which there are election results, 40 percent of votes were exhausted (Anere and Wheen 2009:23) .That a smaller proportion of votes was exhausted in Koroba-Lake Kopiago in 2007 will have contributed to the larger mandates witnessed by both the winning candidate and the runner-up, as compared with the 2006 by-election.
The Koroba-Lake Kopiago results also reveal that candidates have little control over the way their supporters allocate preferences. In short, preference deals did not work. Indeed, although Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye entered into a memorandum of understanding to exchange preferences, only 166 of the 1252 votes Magaye gained flowed to Peri on Magaye's elimination. By contrast, 461 flowed across the ethnic divide to the sitting MP John Kekeno, while 408 flowed to Peri's key rival Petrus Thomas. Similarly, only 18 of Thomas Tupia's 810 votes flowed to Matthew Magaye upon elimination. Instead the vast majority went to Petrus Thomas (288) and Ben Peri (279) and a good number (140) to John Kekeno.
In both of these cases some votes initially captured by a Duna candidate flowed to a Huli candidate. Despite the widespread rhetoric that preferences should be retained within the same cultural, ethnic or linguistic group, a significant proportion of votes flowed across the ethnic divide with each and every elimination (Table 21 .12). Overall, some 44 percent of the Duna votes distributed as the first nine Duna candidates were eliminated flowed to Huli candidates. This suggests that for a significant proportion of voters enmities between rival candidates within the same ethnic group or the pulling power of money proved stronger than calls for ethnic unity.
Either way, strong candidates (Huli and Duna alike) managed to gain a spread of votes and preferences across the electorate (cf. May 2006:118 The garnering of broad-based support cannot, in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago case, be attributed to LPV. Indeed it predates the switch to preferential voting. In 2003 the winning candidate, Petrus Thomas, gained votes from 64 polling places. He polled particularly well at half of all polling stations, ranking first in respect of 23 ballot boxes and second in respect of a further 17 ballot boxes. The runner-up, Ben Peri, had arguably even broader support, picking up votes in all but four ballot boxes. He gained the largest or second largest vote in just over half the ballot boxes (43/80)-being the top-polling candidate at 16 polling places and second-highest ranked candidate at a further 27 polling places.
Conclusion
In 2007, fraud, malpractice and money triumphed yet again in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate. As a consequence, the election results lack integrity. Had the election been the least bit fair, the outcome would most likely have been very different. Certainly there would have been far fewer votes. It is worth noting, too, that during the 2003 supplementary elections the total number of votes cast in North Koroba and South Koroba was 16,385. This was because there was a huge security presence, and because the security forces did not allow multiple and under-age voting. Based on projections from the 1990 census the expected enrolment for these two LLG areas at that time was 16,280. In 2007, the expected enrolments for North Koroba and South Koroba were 18,110, yet 30,288 votes were cast. These additional votes were surely enough to have changed the order in which candidates were eliminated, which in turn would have changed the flow of preferences and most likely the overall outcome.
Two key factors contributed to and facilitated the cheating and malpractice (under-age voting, double and multiple voting, serial voting and outside voting) observed on polling day. The first was the poor state of the new electoral roll, which included children, dead people, and people from neighbouring electorates (particularly the Tari electorate), as well as thousands of duplicates, and the second was the location and positioning of polling stations. As noted above, polling places were often set up side by side to facilitate voter movement between polling stations.
It is also worth noting that LPV affected the results in only one-fifth of all electorates (Anere and Wheen 2009:27) , and that, in 80 percent of cases, the candidate who led at the end of the first preference count went on to win the seat. In other words, preferences affected few outcomes. And yet in terms of electoral administration, LPV is more certainly costly and more difficult to administer. Overall the introduction of LPV has required a lot of effort and expense for very little gain, and it may be that in the longer term the negative consequences, such as the proliferation of money politics, will far outweigh any benefits.
In the meantime, it is evident that the PNGEC was willing to turn a blind eye to the rampant fraud and malpractice witnessed in Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open electorate in 2007. Indeed there was a clear resolve, which came direct from the prime minister himself, to avoid a repetition of the events of 2002, and as a consequence the elections in Southern Highlands Province drew little scrutiny. Seemingly there was a willingness to accept the election results 'no matter what transpired'; this is the legacy of 2002. It is hoped that the electoral environment in 2012 will make for more honest assessments of future elections and that the PNGEC will not be scared to fail elections that should clearly be deemed to have failed. With development of the liquefied natural gas project well under way, the stakes are much higher than ever before and this only serves to further fuel the win-at-all-costs mentality the has emerged over the last decade or so. 
